Resolving a Conjecture on Degree of Regularity of Linear Homogeneous Equations

A linear equation is $r$-regular, if, for every $r$-coloring of the positive integers, there exist positive integers of the same color which satisfy the equation. In 2005, Fox and Radoicic conjectured that the equation $x_1 + 2x_2 + \cdots + 2^{n-2}x_{n-1} - 2^{n-1}x_n = 0$, for any $n \geq 2$, has a degree of regularity of $n-1$, which would verify a conjecture of Rado from 1933. Rado's conjecture has since been verified with a different family of equations. In this paper, we show that Fox and Radoicic's family of equations indeed have a degree of regularity of $n-1$. We also provide a few extensions of this result.Comment: 8 page

Acyclic Subgraphs of Planar Digraphs

An acyclic set in a digraph is a set of vertices that induces an acyclic subgraph. In 2011, Harutyunyan conjectured that every planar digraph on $n$ vertices without directed 2-cycles possesses an acyclic set of size at least $3n/5$. We prove this conjecture for digraphs where every directed cycle has length at least 8. More generally, if $g$ is the length of the shortest directed cycle, we show that there exists an acyclic set of size at least $(1 - 3/g)n$.Comment: 9 page

Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning in General Games

We show that Optimistic Hedge -- a common variant of multiplicative-weights-updates with recency bias -- attains ${\rm poly}(\log T)$ regret in multi-player general-sum games. In particular, when every player of the game uses Optimistic Hedge to iteratively update her strategy in response to the history of play so far, then after $T$ rounds of interaction, each player experiences total regret that is ${\rm poly}(\log T)$. Our bound improves, exponentially, the $O({T}^{1/2})$ regret attainable by standard no-regret learners in games, the $O(T^{1/4})$ regret attainable by no-regret learners with recency bias (Syrgkanis et al., 2015), and the ${O}(T^{1/6})$ bound that was recently shown for Optimistic Hedge in the special case of two-player games (Chen & Pen, 2020). A corollary of our bound is that Optimistic Hedge converges to coarse correlated equilibrium in general games at a rate of $\tilde{O}\left(\frac 1T\right)$.Comment: 40 page